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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Trevor Glenn Lee appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. The district court erred in concluding that a police officer’s frisk of Mr. Lee
was reasonable. A reasonably prudent person in the position of the police officer would
not have been justified in concluding that Mr. Lee presented a risk of danger where he
was stopped on the sidewalk, was reluctant to make contact with the officer, had fled
from a previous encounter with the officer, and said he had a pocket knife. The district
court also erred in concluding that a search conducted by the officer when Mr. Lee was
being detained for driving without privileges was a search incident to his arrest for
possession of a controlled substance, when the officer had not discovered any
controlled substances prior to the search.

This Court should vacate Mr. Lee’s

conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand
this case to the district court for further proceedings.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Jonathon Laurenson observed Mr. Lee driving a blue Chevrolet pickup
truck at approximately 7:45 p.m. on May 16, 2015. (5/26/15 Tr., p.4, L.15 – p.5, L.24.)
Officer Laurenson recognized Mr. Lee from a traffic stop that had occurred “a couple
months prior where drugs and narcotics were seized out of [Mr. Lee’s] vehicle.”
(5/26/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.7-16.)

Officer Laurenson suspected Mr. Lee might be driving

without a valid license and confirmed through dispatch that Mr. Lee’s license was
suspended. (5/26/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-17.) Officer Laurenson observed Mr. Lee park his
vehicle in a gas station parking lot, exit his vehicle, and then enter the gas station store.
1

(5/26/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-13.) Officer Laurenson observed Mr. Lee leave the gas station
store and walk away from the gas station and away from his vehicle. (5/26/15 Tr., p.7,
Ls.3-7.) Officer Laurenson activated his lights, exited his patrol car, and made contact
with Mr. Lee on the sidewalk. (8/7/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-7.) Mr. Lee “appeared to be
reluctant” and “didn’t want to have contact” with Officer Laurenson. (8/7/15 Tr., p.10,
Ls.7-8.)
Officer Laurenson advised Mr. Lee he would be issuing him a citation for driving
without privileges. (5/26/15 Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.1.) He asked Mr. Lee if he was
carrying any weapons and Mr. Lee said, “I have a pocket knife,” and indicated towards
his back pocket.

(8/7/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-18; Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, 20:41:55-

20:42:02.) Officer Laurenson testified he “wanted to do a weapons pat search based on
his demeanor and everything like that for my safety.” (5/26/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-19.)
After he began the patdown, Officer Laurenson observed “a very large bulge” in the left
front pocket of Mr. Lee’s pants. (5/26/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-7; 8/7/15 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11,
L.2.) He felt the area of the bulge and detected several items, one of which he believed
to be a pocket knife. (8/7/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.6-9.) Officer Laurenson asked Mr. Lee if he
could remove the items from his pocket, but Mr. Lee did not consent. (5/26/15 Tr., p.11,
Ls.20-23.) Officer Laurenson then removed the items one at a time by pushing them up
from the outside of Mr. Lee’s pocket. (8/7/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-15.) Officer Laurenson
recovered two small round Carmex containers,1 one long cylindrical Chapstick

The district court referred to the small round containers as Chapstick containers, but
they are actually Carmex containers, not Chapstick containers. (See Mot. to Suppress,
Ex. A, 21:00:02-45.)
1
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container, a money clip, a small tin canister, and a pocket knife. (5/26/15 Tr., p.13,
Ls.5-12; 8/7/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-17.)
After recovering these items, Officer Laurenson handcuffed Mr. Lee, placed him
in the back of his patrol car, and told him, “You’re just being detained right now, you
understand?” (8/7/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23; Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, 20:45:36-40.) Officer
Laurenson said, “You’re going to get a citation for driving without privileges. In the
meantime, you’re going to sit in the back of my car.”

(Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A,

20:45:58-46:02.) Officer Laurenson testified that he did not intend to arrest Mr. Lee for
driving without privileges. (5/26/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.12-14; 8/7/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.22-24.) He
testified that he “detained [Mr. Lee] because [he] recognized the objects that came out
of his pocket to be probably more than likely paraphernalia.” (5/26/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.911.)
After detaining Mr. Lee, Officer Laurenson opened and searched the containers
he had found in Mr. Lee’s pocket. (8/7/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-13.) He first opened the “most
worn Chapstick container” and found a green leafy substance that he recognized to be
marijuana.

(5/26/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-17; 8/7/15 Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.3.)

Officer

Laurenson then opened the tin canister and found a “clear little baggy with some
powdery residue in it.” (8/7/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-10.) After searching all of the containers,
Officer Laurenson arrested Mr. Lee for possession of a controlled substance. (Mot. to
Suppress, Ex. A, 20:50:09-22, 20:55:55-58.)
Mr. Lee was charged by Information with felony possession of a controlled
substance in CR 2015-768.

(R., pp.52-53.)

He was charged with misdemeanor

possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and

3

misdemeanor driving without privileges in CR 2015-766.
consolidated in the district court.

(R., p.27.)

The two cases were

Mr. Lee filed a motion to suppress,

challenging the constitutionality of Officer Laurenson’s frisk and his search of the
containers he found in Mr. Lee’s pocket. (R., pp.95-97.) The State filed a response,
arguing the frisk and search of the containers was lawful under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968). (R., pp.103-09.) The district court held a hearing, at which Officer Laurenson
testified. (R., pp.110-11.) Following the hearing, both parties submitted supplemental
briefing. (R., pp.114-22, 123-29, 141-47, 148-52.)
The district court denied Mr. Lee’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.154-64.) The
district court first concluded that Officer Laurenson’s frisk of Mr. Lee was authorized
pursuant to Terry. (R., pp.156-58.) The district court explained, “[Mr.] Lee’s reluctant
attitude and noncompliance with Officer requests, coupled with the bulge in his front
pocket and his previous encounter with law enforcement, could lead a reasonable
person to infer that he was armed and dangerous.” (R., p.157.) The district court then
concluded that Officer Laurenson exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk when
he opened the containers he found in Mr. Lee’s pocket because he did not have reason
to believe the containers posed a threat to officer safety. (R., pp.157-58.) The district
court concluded, however, that the search of the containers was permissible as a
search

incident

to

Mr. Lee’s

arrest

because

the

search

was

“substantially

contemporaneous” with the arrest. (R., p.162.) Mr. Lee filed a motion to reconsider,
which the district court denied. (R., pp.166-72, 173-75.)
The parties then entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Mr. Lee pled
guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and the State dismissed the
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misdemeanor charges and recommended that Mr. Lee be placed on probation for a
period of three years. (R., pp.186-90.) Mr. Lee reserved his right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.189.) The district court sentenced Mr. Lee to a
unified term of four years, with 18 months fixed, and then suspended the sentence and
placed Mr. Lee on probation for a period of four years. (R., p.216.) The judgment was
entered on February 12, 2016, and Mr. Lee filed a timely notice of appeal on March 1,
2016, referencing both case numbers.

(R., pp.218-23, 224-29.)

The district court

entered separate judgments dismissing the misdemeanor charges in CR 2015-766 on
February 5, 2016. (R., pp.249-54.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Lee’s motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Lee’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court erred in concluding that Officer Laurenson’s frisk of Mr. Lee was

authorized pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a reasonably prudent
person in the officer’s position would not have been justified in concluding that Mr. Lee
was armed and presently dangerous at the time of the frisk. Regardless of whether the
frisk was authorized pursuant to Terry, the district court correctly concluded that Officer
Laurenson exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk when he opened the containers he
found in Mr. Lee’s pocket. However, the district court erred again in concluding that
Officer Laurenson’s search of the containers was authorized pursuant to the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Mr. Lee was not, and could not
have been, arrested for possession of a controlled substance prior to the search of the
containers. Officer Laurenson’s search of the containers was not a search incident to
Mr. Lee’s arrest; it was a search that led to his arrest. Both the initial frisk and the
search of the containers found in Mr. Lee’s pocket violated Mr. Lee’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). The Court will accept
the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157
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Idaho 416, 418 (2014). However, the Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

Officer Laurenson’s Frisk Of Mr. Lee Violated His Right To Be Free From
Unreasonable Searches Because, At The Moment Of The Frisk, The Officer Did
Not Have Reason To Believe That Mr. Lee Was Armed And Presently
Dangerous
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

In order to be reasonable, a search must be

authorized by a warrant based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818 (2009). One exception
to the warrant requirement is a patdown for weapons, as recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). See id. Under Terry, an
officer may conduct a limited patdown for weapons, referred to as a frisk, if “at the
moment of the frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is
investigating is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others and nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer’s belief.” State v. Crooks, 150
Idaho 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2010). “The purpose of this exception is to enable an officer to
continue the contact with the individual without fear of violence.” State v. Davenport,
144 Idaho 99, 101 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted).
Whether a frisk is reasonable is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. See State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 292 (Ct. App. 2001). “The
test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a
risk of danger.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818 (citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard,
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the officer must indicate specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, in light of his or her experience, justify the officer’s
suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 818-19 (quotation marks
and citations omitted). “Although an officer need not possess absolutely certainty that
an individual is armed and dangerous, an officer’s inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch is not enough to justify a frisk.” Id. at 819 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would not
have been justified in concluding that Mr. Lee posed a risk of danger at the time of the
frisk.

The district court concluded the frisk was reasonable based on Mr. Lee’s

“reluctant attitude and noncompliance with Officer requests, coupled with the bulge in
his front pocket and his previous encounter with law enforcement.”

(R., p.157.)

The

district court clearly erred in two of the factual findings that are relevant to this analysis.
First, the district court found Mr. Lee “did not verbally respond” when Officer Laurenson
asked him if he was carrying any weapons.

(R., p.155.)

This finding is clearly

erroneous, as Mr. Lee can be heard on the video recording stating, “I have a pocket
knife,” in response to Officer Laurenson’s question. (Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, 20:41:5520:42:02.) Second, Officer Laurenson did not observe a bulge in Mr. Lee’s front pocket
until after he began the frisk. (5/26/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-7; 8/7/15 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11,
L.2.) Thus, the bulge could not have been one of the factors that justified the frisk, as
the district court found.
What we have, then, is Mr. Lee’s reluctant attitude and noncompliance and the
circumstances of his previous encounter with law enforcement.
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Mr. Lee’s reluctant

attitude and noncompliance suggest that he did not want to interact with Officer
Laurenson; they do not suggest he was armed and presently dangerous.

This is

supported by the circumstances of Mr. Lee’s previous encounter with law enforcement,
when he ran away from Officer Laurenson, but was not violent, did not have any
weapons on him, and did not physically resist in any way. (5/26/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-17;
8/7/15 Tr., p.20, L.21 – p.21, L.2; p.22, Ls.4-14.) In the present case, Mr. Lee admitted
to having a pocket knife on him, but there is absolutely no indication he intended to use
it (or anything else) as a weapon.
In State v. Henage, a police officer conducted a frisk of the passenger of a
vehicle that had been pulled over for a broken taillight. 143 Idaho 655, 657-58 (2007).
The officer decided to conduct the frisk after observing the passenger’s nervous
behavior and learning the passenger had a knife. Id. at 658.

The Court reversed the

district court and held that the frisk was unlawful. Id. at 662-63. The Court reasoned
that the passenger’s nervous appearance did not justify the conclusion that he was
armed and presently dangerous because the officer “did not connect [the passenger’s]
nervousness with anything tending to demonstrate a risk to his safety.” Id. at 662-62.
And the passenger’s admission that he had a knife did not justify the frisk because the
fact that someone possesses a weapon does not necessarily mean that the person
poses a risk of danger. Id. at 662. The circumstances in Henage indicated that the
passenger was not dangerous because he did not act threatening, did not have a
reputation for violence, did not make any furtive movements, and was cooperative and
polite. Id. at 661-62.
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In State v. Bishop, the officer who frisked the defendant testified that he
conducted the frisk for officer safety, but did not identify any objective facts supporting
his conclusion that his safety was in danger. 146 Idaho at 819. The Idaho Supreme
Court reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress,
explaining “there was evidence that [the defendant] was acting nervous and may have
been under the influence of a narcotic, [but] those facts alone are not enough to justify
the frisk.” Id. at 820. The Court noted that the officer did not testify that the defendant
“behaved in an aggressive or threatening manner or that, based on his experience,
suspects under the influence of narcotics tend to resort to violence.” Id.
When asked at the preliminary hearing why he wanted to frisk Mr. Lee, Officer
Laurenson answered that he “wanted to do a weapons pat search based on his
demeanor and everything like that for my safety.” (5/26/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-19.) At the
suppression hearing, Officer Laurenson was asked, “Now, why did you pat search him?
What was your reason?” and he responded, “For safety.” (8/7/15 Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12,
L.1.) An officer’s inchoate and unparticularized concern for his safety is simply not
enough to justify a frisk. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819. The facts articulated by Officer
Laurenson, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, cannot justify
his subjective impression that Mr. Lee was armed and presently dangerous at the
moment of the frisk. The district court thus erred in concluding the frisk was permissible
under Terry.2

If the Court agrees that the district court erred in concluding the frisk was permissible
under Terry, it need not reach the next issue, as the containers would not have been
found but for the wrongful frisk. The containers, and the drugs found inside, would thus
be considered fruits of the wrongful frisk, and subject to suppression. See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518-19 (2012).

2
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D.

Officer Laurenson’s Search Of The Containers He Found In Mr. Lee’s Pocket
Also Violated Mr. Lee’s Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches Because
It Was Not Authorized Pursuant To The Search Incident To Arrest Exception To
The Warrant Requirement
The district court concluded that Officer Laurenson’s search of the containers he

found in Mr. Lee’s pocket was a permissible search incident to arrest because, prior to
the search, Officer Laurenson had probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee for driving with a
suspended license and “the search and arrest were substantially contemporaneous.”
(R., p.162.)

A search conducted incident to arrest is one of the well-recognized

exceptions to the warrant requirement. See State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838 (2004).
A search incident to arrest permits police to search an arrestee following
a lawful custodial arrest and is premised upon the dual justifications of
necessity to (1) protect the officer and other persons in the vicinity from
any dangerous objects or weapons in the possession of the person
arrested; and (2) prevent concealment or destruction of evidence within
the reach of the arrestee.
Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
The district court’s conclusion that Officer Laurenson’s search of the containers
he found in Mr. Lee’s pocket was a search incident to arrest ignores the fact that Officer
Laurenson did not arrest Mr. Lee for driving with a suspended license either prior to or
after the search.

Before searching the containers, Officer Laurenson handcuffed

Mr. Lee, placed him in the back of his patrol car and told him he was going to receive a
citation for driving with a suspended license.

(8/7/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23; Mot. to

Suppress, Ex. A, 20:45:36-20:46:02.) Officer Laurenson then searched the containers
and, based on the fruits of that search, arrested Mr. Lee for possession of a controlled
substance.

There is no “search incident to citation” exception to the warrant

requirement and, while a search conducted incident to arrest need not precede the
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arrest in order to pass constitutional muster, the fruits of the search cannot provide the
probable cause for the arrest. The district court’s denial of Mr. Lee’s motion to suppress
must be reversed.
1.

The Search Of The Containers Cannot Be Justified As A Search Incident
To Arrest Because The Probable Cause For The Arrest Was Provided By
The Fruits Of The Search

Mr. Lee was not, and could not, have been arrested for possession of a
controlled substance prior to the search of the containers found in his pocket. It was the
search of those containers that provided probable cause for Mr. Lee’s arrest for
possession of a controlled substance. Because the search of the containers provided
the probable cause for the arrest, it was a not a lawful search incident to arrest. See
Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) (per curiam) (holding warrantless search of
defendant’s bag could not be justified as a search incident to arrest when defendant
was arrested for drug abuse only after drug paraphernalia was found in his bag).
The district court relied on State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346 (Ct. App. 2008),
and State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that a search
that precedes an arrest can constitute a valid search incident to arrest. (R., pp.160-61.)
This proposition is true, as far as it goes, but it does not apply here because Officer
Laurenson did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee for possession of a controlled
substance prior to the search which resulted in evidence of that offense.
In State v. Chapman, the Court of Appeals considered “whether the trooper’s
search inside [the defendant’s] clothing, where cocaine was found, was lawful.” 146
Idaho at 351. The district court held the search was permissible as a search incident to
arrest because the officer possessed probable cause to arrest the defendant for
13

possession of cocaine prior to the search. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating
that “[s]o long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and the
fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest, the
search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that arrest.” Id.
(citation omitted). The Court concluded that the search was a lawful search incident to
arrest because “the facts known to the trooper gave rise to probable cause to arrest [the
defendant] for possession of cocaine before the search that revealed the cocaine.” Id.
at 352.
In State v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s admission to
having marijuana in his pocket created probable cause for the officer to arrest him for
possession of marijuana, and the officer’s seizure of a bag of marijuana from the
defendant’s pocket was therefore a valid search incident to arrest. 137 Idaho at 662.
The Court held that the fact that the officer removed the marijuana from the defendant’s
pocket prior to the formal arrest “does not invalidate the search.” Id.
In both Chapman and Johnson, the officers had probable cause to arrest the
defendants for two particular offenses prior to conducting searches which resulted in
further evidence of those offenses. The same is not true here. Officer Laurenson did
not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee for possession of a controlled substance prior
to the search which resulted in evidence of that offense. Chapman and Johnson are
thus inapposite. The district court erred in concluding that the search of the containers
taken from Mr. Lee’s pocket was a search incident to his arrest for possession of a
controlled substance, when he was not and could not have been arrested for that
offense absent the fruits of the search.
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2.

The Search Of The Containers Cannot Be Justified As A Search Incident
To Citation Because There Is No Search Incident To Citation Exception To
The Warrant Requirement And The Search Of The Containers Did Not
Implicate Either Of The Historic Rationales For The Search Incident To
Arrest Exception

Officer Laurenson told Mr. Lee he was going to receive a citation for driving with
a suspended license, and then searched the containers he found in Mr. Lee’s pocket.
(8/7/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23; Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, 20:45:36-20:46:02.) The United
States Supreme Court has held that where an officer issues only a citation or summons,
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply. See
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (rejecting a “search incident to citation”
exception to the warrant requirement). The Knowles Court held that when the historic
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception are not present, the justification for
the search is immediately withdrawn. Id. at 118-19; see also LaMay, 140 Idaho at 840
(discussing Knowles); State v. Pederson, 157 Idaho 790, 794 (Ct. App. 2014) (“[A]ll
searches incident to arrest must be tethered to the Chimel justifications.”).
In the present case, neither of the two historic rationales for the search incident
to arrest exception applied.

See Knowles, 525 U.S. at 116 (discussing historic

rationales for the search incident to arrest exception). First, Officer Laurenson did not
need to disarm Mr. Lee in order to take him into custody. Mr. Lee was handcuffed and
detained in the back of Officer Laurenson’s patrol car at the time Officer Laurenson
searched the containers. Second, there was no way the content of the containers could
have provided evidence for the offense of driving without privileges, which is the offense
for which Mr. Lee was being detained. See id.; see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
344 (2009) (holding search of the passenger compartment of defendant’s car was
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unreasonable because police could not reasonably have believed that evidence for the
offense of driving without privileges might have been found in the search and because
police could not reasonably have believed the defendant could have accessed his car at
the time of the search).
As the district court correctly recognized, Officer Laurenson opened the
containers he found in Mr. Lee’s pocket because he suspected they contained evidence
of drugs. (R., p.158, n.3.) Obtaining evidence relevant to a new offense is not one of
the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
The district court erred in concluding that Officer Laurenson’s search of the containers
he found in Mr. Lee’s pocket was authorized pursuant to the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement and its order denying Mr. Lee’s motion to
suppress must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Lee respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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